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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH LAKE FARMERS ASSOCIATION, 
an unincorporated association; PRO·V:O CI-
TY, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE 
NO. 8078 
This is an intermediate appeal. The issues for deter-
mination are questions of law arising from the pleadings. 
They involve ~counterclaims filed by the defendants and re-
spondents which the appellants assert state no ,claim upon 
which relief can be granted. Also involved is appellants' 
reply, portions of which were strieken by the trial court 
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and of which action appellants now complain. The ·case also 
involves a ·cross appeal filed by the defendants and respond· 
ents raising the question of necessary parties to the action 
and a claim of error on the part of the trial court in fail· 
ing to strike a portion of the defense interposed thereto by 
the plaintiffs and appellants. 
The case is a case of major importance, and defend-
ants take the position, as do the appellants, that background 
information will probably prove helpful to the Court. The 
statement of facts in appellants'. brief goes far afield, even 
on the theory of background information. It appears to 
. disregard the very pleadings upon which this appeal must 
be determined. Appellants cite and quote from cases to 
which the respondents were not parties, and which have no 
determinative bearing upon the instant case. Respondents, 
therefore, find it necessary to comment at length upon the 
facts involved in the .. instant matter, and those facts ,will 
be treated herein under headings which substantially cor-
respond to those set out in the appellants' statement. 
The appellants will usually be referred to as plaintiffs 
and the respondents and the cross appellants will usually 
be referred to as defendants The respondents include all 
of the named defendants except defendants W. A. Knight, 
H. B. Woodbury, and Ward C. Holbrook, all members of 
the Utah Lake Commission. Said members have not an-
swered in any way and counsel appearing herein as attor-
neys for the defendants do not represent those individuals. 
All other defendants have responded. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Geography 
The general statements concerning the geography of 
Utah Lake set out in appellants' brief are substantially cor-
rect. It should be added, however, that hundreds of farmers 
own land adjacent to Utah Lake and that the level of the 
lake may determine whether those farmers can raise pro-
fitable crops or have pasturage or whether the lands will 
be flooded and the operations interrupted and the property 
destroyed. By virtue of the fact that there is a gradual 
incline of the shores of Utah Lake, and because of the shal-
lowness of the lake, a slight variation in the surface eleva-
tion of the lake may and does affect hundreds of acres of 
surrounding land. It should also be noted that defendant, 
Provo City, is the owner of a golf course, airport, a city 
park, a boat harbor and club ·house and other properties and 
structures of great value, all of which are within the area 
affected when the level of the lake rises above the compro-
mise elevation. 
Devel~pment of rights to the use of water 
from Utah Lake and Jordan River 
Respondents take the position that the appellants' state-
ments concerning the development of rights to the use of 
water must be qualified in two material respects, namely: 
1. That extent of plaintiffs' water rights are question-
able inasmuch as they have never been determined as 
against the defendants, and are believed to be grossly over-
stated. 
2. That additional appropriations have been claimed 
by the plaintiffs and others since the date of the compro-
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mise agreement, and while appellants assume to operate, 
control and administer such additional rights or claims on 
the basis of the compromise agreement, they have no au-
thority whatsoever so to do. 
Compromise Agreement 
Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, the compromise 
agreement did not "fully settle" the controversy arising from 
the plaintiffs' holding back and storing the water of Utah 
Lake. The eompromise agreement ,contemplated liability 
on the part of plaintiffs if plaintiffs impounded waters in a 
manner ·and to an extent unauthorized by the terms of the 
agreement. That premise was recognized in Salt Lake City 
vs Colladge, 13 Utah 522, 45 Pac. 891, and in the corrected 
decree thereafter entered by the district court pursuant to 
the Supreme Court decision. The corrected decree con-
tained the following provision: 
"That this deeree shall not in any way prevent the 
defendants or any of them from entering suits against 
the plaintiffs or any of them for future violations of 
the terms of the said contract or of this decree." 
Manifestly, there were other unsettled questions con-
cerning the use of Utah Lake by persons or firms not par-
ties to the compromise agreement, or on their behalf, such 
as questions eoncerning the maintenance by plaintiff of the 
carrying capacity of the river and of the storage of water 
not contemplated by the compromise agreement, like trans-
mountain diversions. 
Contrary to the assumption and inference contained in 
the plaintiffs' statements, compromise agreement was de-
signed not only to protect defendants from lake water in 
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excess of compromise elevation but also to afford defend-
ants the use of their lands below that elevation except when 
such land was inundated up to eompromise as a result of 
practices, structures and operations authorized by the com-
promise agreement itself. 
The Utah Lake ~Commission, eontrary to appellants' 
assertions, had no general authority to represent the parties 
as agents. The commission's discretionary power extends 
only to a determination of weather conditions and times 
under which the anticipated run-off would justify holding 
back the water in the lake without causing the same to ex-
ceed the compromise elevation. The instant ~case does not 
involve that discretionary power of the commission, but does 
involve unauthorized and ex:cessive obstruction; the hold-
ing back of water when the lake was already above com-
promise, and the question of storage of water not contem-
plated by the ~compromise agreement, and other related mat-
ters. For example, the first paragraph of the compromise 
agreement grants the right to maintain the dam in the Jor-
dan River, known as the Jordan Dam, situated at or near 
the boundary line between Salt Lake and Utah ~Counties, 
as constituted with an opening or water way through said 
dam to be left at all times free and open except as herein-
after specified, and also the right free from interference or 
liability for damage to flow the lands of the defendants to 
the extent that the said dam, above descri~d, may cause 
the same to be flowed by the waters of Jordan River, Utah 
Lake, o,r otherwise. And, the right to flow the lands of the 
said parties to the extent which might be caused by plac-
ing obstructions in the water way in said dam according 
to the limits therein specified for the purpose of holding 
back and retaining the water in Utah Lake at an elevation 
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not to exceed 3 ~t 3~ inches above the points there-
tofore established and recognized as low water mark. The 
commission provided for under the agreement was "for the 
purpose of better carrying the foregoing into effect.'' The 
agreement expressly provided that the board was empow-
ered "as the legally constituted agents of the parties hereto, 
to determine and direct when and to what extent obstruc-
tions may be placed in the water way of the dam for the 
purpose of storing the lake with water for future use not 
to exceed the highest elevation hereinafter specified." The 
agreement specifies the manner in which the commission 
can exercise its authority and limits it in such activities 
dependent upon judgment as to the fall of snow and mois-
ture during the winter. It is made clear in the agreement 
that the level of the lake cannot be maintained above com-
promise through manipulation of the dams or by other ob-
structions placed or permitted in the river. The power of 
the commission as agents of the parties is not involved in 
this law suit. 
The Colladge case 
Obviously, excerpts from the decree of the court in 
the Colladge case (Salt Lake City vs. Colladge, 13 Utah 
522; 45 Pac. 891) must be considered in connection with the 
particular issues involved in that case and in the light of 
other provisions of the decree The excerpts quoted by the 
plaintiffs, whether taken in context or separately, do not 
have the effect ascribed them by the plaintiffs. The lang-
uage of the decree dealing with the right of the plaintiffs 
to maintain the water of the lake at ·compromise point must 
be ~considered in the light of additional conditions added un-
der the contract and in the light of the provisions of the 
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contract and the decree limiting the right to store water in 
accordance with the conditions and circumstances therein 
specified and prescribed. The language of the Colladge case 
referring to the commission as being "constituted the 
agents of both parties to the contract" must be considered 
in the light of the function of the commission, which cer-
tainly would not include the impairment or destruction of 
the very rights and limitations expressly established and 
provided for in the contract itself. 
Appellants, in their brief (pages 7-10), refer to the de-
cree as "very significant construction of compromise agree-
ment as to the purpose, status and power of the Utah Lake 
Commission." We are at loss to understand the great sig-
nificance attached thereto by the appellants, for the reason 
that here no claim is made that any obstructions causing 
damage during the flooding of 1952 were ordered in by the 
commission between O·ctober 1st and the following March 
15, or at all. The important phase of the Colladge decision 
as far as the issues now before this Court are concerned is 
that part dealing with the right of plaintiffs to raise the 
sill of Indian Ford Dam by 22 inches because of the alter-
ations by plaintiffs of the channel of the Jordan River after 
the compromise agreement had been made and executed. 
· After the signing of the compromise agreement and prior 
to the decision in the Colladge case, sometime during the 
period 1885-1895, a bar in the Jordan River known as "New 
Bar" and a bar at the head of the river were removed· by 
plaintiffs as a result of dredging operations in the river, and 
in the Colladge ease plaintiffs asserted that the "New Dam" 
or Indian Ford Dam could be raised 22 inches without ob-
structing the flow any more than the bars purportedly re-
moved by the plaintiffs would have obstructed the flow. 
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The trial court allowed the plaintiffs a raise of 14 inches. 
The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to an increase of 22 inches above the original eleva-
tion, which said original elevation was six inches below the 
sill of the old dam authorized by -compromise agreement. 
Neither the '"Old" or "Jordan Dam" nor the "New" or "In-
dian Ford Dam'' are now in operation. Asswning, however, 
that the sills or floors of the dams now used in place of those 
dams are not higher than the elevation authorized by the 
Colladge decision, the significant point is what has happened 
to the Jordan River channel since the plaintiffs secured this 
right to raise the floor of the Indian.Ford Dam. The coun-
terclaims allege that plaintiffs, since that time, and particu-
larly during recent years, have permitted other and addi-
tional obstructions to fill the river and to retard the flow 
thereof. The very premise of the Colladge decision clearly 
indicates that since the plaintiffs acquired the right to raise 
the dam by reason of the increased carrying capacity of the 
river due to the removal of the bars that were in the river, 
the plaintiffs by that the very token will be required to re-
linquish or otherwise compensate for the extra dam height 
so acquired when other or similar obstructions have been 
permitted to retard the flow of the river. It follows that 
the significance of the CoHadge case is not in the respects 
claimed by the plaintiffs but establishes the principle that 
the effect of the compromise agreement must he determined 
in view of matters then existing and then in reasonable con-
templation of the parties. The plaintiffs obtained the extra 
22 inches because of changes occurring in the bed of the 
river subsequent to compromise agreement. When addi-
tional obstructions in the river retard the flow and impound 
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the waters, the same principle requires a corresponding ad-
justment in favor of the defendants. 
The Morse Decree-The Gardner Case 
The decree in Salt Lake City, .et al vs. Salt Lake City 
Water and Electric Power Company, et al, 24 Utah 249, 67 
Pac. 672, popularly known as the "Morse Decree", did not 
involve an action between Utah County landowners and the 
Salt Lake County users, but involved only certain claim-
ants in Salt Lake ·County. No defendant in this action was 
there involved. Appellants mention the appointment of a 
commissioner to "superintend, and direct the measurement 
and diversion of all water distributed by this decree in ac-
cordance therewith; to direct, supervise and inspect all mains 
and appliances for the diversion, conveyance and use of the 
same and to report from time to time to the court any vio-
lation of the terms of this decree." The powers of the com-
missioner under the Morse Decree have no effect whatever 
on the rights of the Utah County land owners, and cannot 
in any way serve to extend the rights of the plaintiffs un-
der compromise agreement, or otherwise, to store water up-
on the lands of the defendants. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in the Morse Decree recognized the limitations of the 
compromise agreement upon plaintiffs' right to store water 
in Utah Lake (see page 674). That decision is pertinent 
only to show the rights of the respective plaintiffs as among 
themselves. It cannot and does not purport to have the ef-
fect of extending the rights of the plaintiffs as against these 
defendants. The decision further holds that since some 
Salt Lake County users were not parties to the compromise 
agreement, the plaintiffs had no right to hold back their 
water in Utah Lake by an impounding dam, ·and it was held 
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that the plaintiff would have to let their water by-pass such 
dam. The decision e~ressly indicated that the plaintiffs' 
rights were subject _to that limitation and "other conditions 
contained in the agreement of compromise entered into in 
1885 between Joseph H. Colladge and others and the said 
city and canal and irrigation companies." 
Another case not mentioned by appellants which 
touches upon the general problem is Salt Lake City, et al. 
vs. Gardner, et al, 3B Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147, which 
involved an appeal by the present plaintiffs from the de-
cision of the trial court upholding a subsequent appropri-
ation of water by one not a party to the compromise agree-
ment as against said plaintiffs, and holding that at the time 
of such subsequent appropriation the lake contained unap-
propriated water when the limitations applicable to plain-
tiffs' rights were considered. The defendants herein were 
not parties to that litigation. 
Diversion works and measuring devices 
in the Jordan River 
Plaintiffs seem to rely upon the supplemental decision 
in Salt Lake City vs. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, 
43 Utah 591, 137 Pac. 638, to justify their diversion works 
and measuring devices in the Jordan River. Neither that 
decision or any other decision has authorized the transfer 
of the height of the Indian Ford Dam to any other 
dams, as bas been attempted ·by the plaintiffs. Nor does 
that decision or any other decision since the Colladge case 
even purport to govern obstructions in the river as be-
tween the plaintiffs and defendants here. It is to be as-
sumed that the diversion and measuring works constructed 
pursuant to the decision are satisfactory for diversion of 
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water among the Salt Lake City claimants; however, these 
works may not be so misused as to obstruct the flow of the 
river and cause the level of the lake to rise above the point 
limited in the compromise agreement. The supplemental 
decision herein mentioned did not involve any of these de-
fendants nor any issue now before this Court The farct 
that the structures may have been maintained in the river 
for a long period of time has no be·aring upon the issues here, 
since defendants ·complain of their effect during unusual 
periods of high water and the operation of recent years. 
The distinction is pointed out in Peay vs. Salt Lake City, et 
al, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac. 206, wherein Peay sued for dam-
ages by reason of the unlawful maintenance of struc-
tures in the Jordan River and wherein it was held that he 
could not recover for the maintenance of structures author-
ized by compromise agreement unless he amended his com-
plaint and alleged and proved that such structures were 
beyond or above those authorized by such agreement. 
It may be helpful to the Court at this point to ·clarify 
the location of the structures now in the river in relation to 
the old structures mentioned in the compromise agreement 
and in the eases herein mentioned. The lowest structure on 
the river bearing on the issues of this case is the so-called 
"diversion dam" of the plaintiffs. This dam is in the nor-
therly portion of the Jordan Narrows just over the line into 
Salt Lake County. The canals of the plaintiff canal com-
panies head there. A short distance up stream from said 
dam is the site of the "Old" or "Jordan Dam." This is the 
original dam placed by plaintiffs or their predecessors and 
was utilized both as an impounding and diversion dam. The 
compromise agreement refers to the sill of that dam and 
stated that it could ·be maintainned as its existing level. 
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This dam is referred to as being near the line between Salt 
Lake and Utah Counties. Said dam is no longer in existence. 
About three-quarters of a mile farther up the river, imme-
diately east of Camp Williams, is the "New" or "Indian Ford 
Dam.'' This was a dam constructed in about 1895 to re-
place the Jordan Dam as an impounding dam. It was the 
elevation of the sill of this dam which was determined in 
the Colladge case. At least the superstructure of the Indian 
Ford Dam has now been removed and the elevation of its 
original sill has been sought to be transferred from that dam 
to the existing diversion and impounding dam now situated 
lower down the river. In addition, the plaintiffs have con-
structed a dam at the head of the Jordan River. It is the 
contention of defendants that both the dam at the head of 
the Jordan River, as well as other obstructions caused or 
permitted by the plaintiffs in the Jordan River, have, of re-
cent years, been increasingly utilized or permitted to restrict 
the flow of water in the river, and have thus been enlarging 
the storage of water on the lands of the defendants. The 
"New Bar" referred to in the Colladge case was located 
about one mile above the Indian Ford Dam Site. 
General Adjudication of water rights in Utah Lake, 
Jordan River and tributaries 
The general adjudication suit referred to by the plain-
tiff in the statement of facts, Salt Lake City vs. Anderson, 
106 Utah 350, 148 Pac. 2d 346, does not involve the same 
issues as are in this case, and is not a bar to this proceeding. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on that question in 
Smith vs. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 Pac. 539. 
Moreover, even though the present case did involve issues 
in common with those in the general adjudication suit, the 
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F\ourth Judicial District Court in and for 'Utah County, 
would not be thereby deprived of jurisdiction. This was 
decided by the Supreme Court in Ernest W. Mitchell vs. 
Spanish Fork West Field Inigation Company, et al, ---
Utah , 265 Pac. 2d 1016. Actually, there is little, if 
any, connection between these two cases. The general ad-
judication is for the adjudication of water rights between 
the claimants thereto. This case involving entirely differ-
ent parties partakes more of the elements of trespass and 
rights of flowage. 
The Water Commissioner appointed pursuant to the 
order of the district court functions only in connection with 
the distribution of water, and has no power to grant, ad-
judicate, or withhold flowage rights affecting the lands of 
these defendants, or to disregard the limitations applicable 
thereto as established by compromise agreement or to dis-
regard the inherent property rights of the defendants. 
Outline of issues in present case 
Utah Lake, the Jordan River, and the diversion works 
for distributing the waters thereof are in some respects one 
complete and entire water system as claimed by plaintiffs. 
However, as shown by the very case cited by them to sus-
tain this proposition, Salt Lake City vs. Utah and Salt Lake 
Canal Co., supra, they are separate in other respects. In that 
case the district court's order requiring a sharing of ex-
penses among Salt Lake users for all diversions, on appel-
lants' theory, was reversed. Moreover, while the various 
elements mentioned are interrelated in many ways, in orthers 
they are separated. Only a part of the Salt Lake ~county 
users were parties to compromise agreement, and only a 
part were parties to the Colladge ·case. The Utah County 
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landowners were not considered sufficiently involved for 
plaintiffs to make them parties to Salt Lake City vs. Utah 
and Salt Lake Canal Co., supra. Finally, only a part of the 
users from Salt Lake County were joined in this suit now 
before the Court or were made parties by plruntiffs herein. 
If in ·an respects the whole system is inseverable and all 
probJems must be handled in unit fashion, as plaintiffs in-
fer, this Court must declare that plaintiffs have failed to 
join indispensable parties such as the numerous other claim-
ants using Jordan River Water ·and not parties to compro-
mise agreement and not now joined by plaintiffs herein. 
The only reason this may not be so is because the rights 
are separable, but certainly, on any theory, plaintiffs cannot 
control the diversions of these other parties by plaintiffs' 
dams and other obstructions as they have done and are do-
ing without being responsible in this lawsuit themselves, 
apart from the question of whether they should have joined 
other parties or not. 
Ever since shortly after compromise agreement was 
reached the plaintiffs have endeavored, on one pretext or 
another, to raise the elevation of compromise point so as 
to make it possible for them to store increased amounts of 
water on . defendants' lands. In the Colladge case itself, 
the original pleadings show that the plaintiffs' major con-
tention was that compromise point was 3 feet 31/2 inches 
above the "meander line" of Utah Lake, rather than above 
low watermarks as fixed in the compromise agreement and 
as tied to the red sandstone at the head of the Jordan River. 
This contention, after the originai answers of the defendco 
ants in the Colladge case, relying upon the red sandstone 
mark, were filed, was abandoned by plaintiffs in the Col-
ladge !case, and the claim with respect to the lowering of the 
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bars in the river as a basis for raising their dam was intro-
duced by plaintiffs by way of amendment to the original 
complaint. (See abstract of record in the Colladge case on 
file in the library of this Court). 
As shown by paragraph 11 of the second defense in this 
case, after the destruction of the Snail Island monwnent, 
which plaintiffs were charged by the decree in the ·Colladge 
case with maintaining, the plaintiffs made further attempts 
to raise compromise point. Up to 1945 a gauge mark lo-
cated at the pumping plant at the head of the Jordan River 
in the vicinity of the original monument, and a gauge at 
Pelican Point, on the western shore of the lake, and other 
gauges on or near the lake were used to check and record 
the level of Utah Lake with reference to compromise point. 
All of said gauges up to 1945 were established, maintained 
and based up on the said stone monwnent near the head 
of the Jordan River and fixed compromise point at four 
feet six inches below the top of this original monwnent. 
In that year or in 1946, however, the association of plain-
tiff companies, known as the Association of Canal Presi-
dents, raised the gauges .32 of a foot, so that the compro-
mise elevation recorded as compromise point and acted upon 
by the Commissioner of Utah Lake, retained as consulting 
engineer by such association, was in effect thereby raised 
correspondingly without the consent of the defendants. 
Thereafter, representatives of the State Engineer's O·ffice, 
as defendants allege, without any authority whatsoever, 
and contrary to the rights of the defendants and those sim-
ilarly situated, asswned to again raise said gauges .21 of a 
foot higher. Now, by the present legal action, plaintiffs are 
attempting, in effect, to again raise compromise point high-
er than the points involved in the previous attempts, that 
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is, to a total of more than six and a ·half inches above the 
point originally designated as compromise point, as defend-
ants claim. 
There are other background circumstances which must 
be considered in order to understand the issues in this case. 
Between the time of the filing of the complaint in this case 
and the time defendants' answers were filed, August 22, 
1952, Utah County had experienced one of the most disas-
trous floods in the history of the valley from a rise in the 
waters of Utah Lake. Large areas of farm land belonging 
to the defendants and those similarly situated had been in-
undated, crops of 1952 destroyed, and the productivity of 
the land impaired for future years. Provo Airport, the 
Provo Boat Harbor and House, and many other improve-
ments and recreational facilities of Provo City were com-
pletely surrounded and in some instances covered with wa-
ter, and it was only by almost superhuman last-minute ef-
forts and an outlay of a large amount of money by Provo 
City, that the dike protecting the Provo Airport was saved 
at all. 
The defendants, when confronted with plaintiffs' suit, 
by which plaintiffs sought the right to store additional wa-
ter upon their land, determined that all matters going to 
the storage, and the resulting damage, including plaintiffs' 
violation of -compromise agreement by the maintenance of 
unauthorized obstructions in the river; the failure to keep 
the river, so adopted as the private channel for water 
claimed by plaintiffs, in an unobstructed condition; the hold-
ing back of water not contemplated by compromise agree-
ment and for interests not parties to compromise agreement; 
and all other matters properly going to the plaintiffs' rights 
to store water on the lands of the defendants should be in-
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terposed as a permissive counterclaim and would probably 
have to be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim at the 
risk of having such claims forever barred should this 
not be done. Certainly it appeared that a counterclaim 
could be filed by the named defendants sued by plglltiffs 
individually, and it appeared reasonable that those sued as 
representatives of all of the owners of land surrounding Utah 
Lake could counterclaim on their behalf by reason of such 
representation, since to hold otherwise will necessitate the 
filing of hundreds of individual suits for damages, contrary, 
it would seem, to the spirit of the new Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The counterclaims in addition to the allegations of the 
answers and affirmative defenses preceding them, set out 
on behalf of the defendants individually named and all oth-
ers in a slmilar situation, the facts claimed by them con-
cerning the lands involved; their value when clear of water; 
the damage which inundation or saturation causes; the con-
templation of compromise agreement that only natural 
drainage and snow and rain run-off from this watershed 
would be held back in Utah Lake; the subsequent trans-
mountain diversions and plaintiffs' acts and claims with re-
spect to the storage thereof; the new claims to wate~r initi-
ated by plaintiffs and others since compromise agreement 
was entered into and the wrongful claim of plaintiffs that 
compromise agreement covers them. It is further alleged 
that plaintiffs have wrongfully raised or caused to be raised 
the gauges by means of which the permissible levels of Utah 
Lake have been dete~rmined. It is further alleged that the 
channel of Jordan River has been adopted by plaintiffs as 
a private channel for the. transportation of their water and 
that in effect their rights under compromise agreement are 
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based upon said channel being kept clear except as to ob-
structions expressly authorized by compromise agreement. 
It is alleged that in recent years, and particularly just prior 
to flooding complained of, there were landslides along the 
Jordan River which materially obstructed the flow of water 
and raised ·the level of Utah Lake, and that plaintiffs have 
failed, neglected and refused to clean out said channel. It 
is further alleged that during previous years, to increase 
carry-over water, and after October 1st, 1951, and during 
1952 to the present time, the plaintiffs without right or au-
thority and in violation of the terms of compromise agree-
ment, caused planks and other obstructions to be placed and 
maintained in the Jordan River and have maintained dams 
without the openings required by said compromise agree-
ment, and that even while the level of Utah Lake was far 
above compromise point during the year 1952 and with un-
precedented runoffs in Utah Lake anticipated and experi-
enced, the plaintiffs, without authority or right, continued 
to so obstruct said Jordan River, thereby unreasonably and 
wrongfully retarding the flow of water from Utah Lake and 
causing large areas of valuable iand surrounding Utah Lake 
belonging to defendants and those similarly situated to be 
and remain inundated, to the great and irreparable damage 
of the owners thereof. ' 
It is further alleged that by reason of the matters set 
out and referred to in the answers and counterclaims and 
the matters set out in the complaint, a dispute has arisen as 
to the location of compromise point and as t~ the monu-
ments determining the same; as to the rights of the plain-
tiffs to store foreign and other waters in Utah Lake and 
concerning the level at which the waters of said lake may 
be maintained; as to the effect of the compromise agree-
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ment upon property owners adjacent to Utah Lake and as 
to responsibilities of the plaintiffs, in using Jordan River as 
a private channel, to keep said channel clear of obstruc-
tions; as to the rights of plaintiffs to maintain planks or 
other obstructions in said river and in plaintiffs' dams and 
as to whether said dams in their present state are author-
ized by said compromise agreement; as to the liability of 
plaintiffs to defendants and those similarly situated for dam-
ages from flooding; and as to the other matters set out and 
referred to in the counterclaim; also that it is necessary 
that the Court declare the rights of the respective parties 
concerning all these matters in order to avoid a great mul-
tiplicity of suits, to permit the proper administration of the 
waters of Utah Lake, and to avoid further irreparable in-
jury to the defendants and others similarly situated. 
In addition to a declaration of rights, injunctive relief 
restraining the plaintiffs and those in privity with them 
from committing or suffering any of the acts or conditions 
complained of is sought. It is further alleged that by rea-
son of the unlawful and improper storage of waters upon 
the lands of defendants and other persons similarly situated 
and the unlawful flooding, inundation and saturation of their 
lands, the named defendants, and other persons similarly 
situated, have suffered damages of more than $950,000.00. 
It is further alleged that until the various elements of right 
and liability are herein determined, and because of the large 
number of claimants in the same position as the defendants 
named, it is impracticable to make specific claims on the 
part of each claimant except defendant, Provo ~City, for dam-
ages at this time, but that it is reasonable, proper and neces-
sary that the Court retain jurisdiction for the purpose of 
entertaining and adjudicating, either directly or through 
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a master, specific claim for damages in favor of the other 
named defendants, and all other persons similarly situated, 
after a determination and declaration by this Court of the 
various elements of liability as against the plaintiffs and of 
the respective rights of the parties. 
As pointed out by appellants, the trial court granted de-
fendants' motion to strike certain portions of plaintiffs' re-
ply to the counterclaims of defendants, and also a portion 
of plaintiffs' answer to the affidavit of defendants for a pre-
liminary injunction. Since the latter ruling involves one 
of the points involved in the first mentioned ruling, and since 
the matter of a preliminary injunction, after the subsiding 
of the flood, was continued without date and has probably 
become moot, we shall not specially note this matter here-
after. 
Upon the· filing of the petition for an intermediate ap-
peal by plaintiffs, the defendants, without waiving any of 
matters set out in their answer to the petition for inter-
mediate appeal, but for consideration by the Court in the 
event it should determine that plaintiffs raised questions of 
which the ·Court finds it should take jurisdiction, for the 
purposes of an intermediate appeal, asked this Court to con-
sider the following matters: 
1. That on or about the 15th day of November, 1951, 
after the plaintiffs' complaint on file herein had been filed 
with the ·court and served upon the named defendants, the 
named defendants filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground, 
among others, that there were indispensable parties omitted 
by plaintiffs, and for the reason that the defendants named 
were not proper representation of all persons similarly sit-
uated or interested in the lands surrounding Utah Lake. 
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2. On or about the 14th day of December, 1951, the 
trial court denied defendants' motion, which order of the 
court is as follows: 
"Defendants' motion to dismiss having been argued 
to the court and the eourt having taken the question 
presented thereby under advisement, and having ex-
amined the statutes, rules and authorities touching the 
questions presented, and being now fully informed, or-
dered that the said motion be, and the same is hereby, 
denied and overruled, without prejudice, however, to 
the defendants art any time during the pendency of the 
cause, to raise the question either as a matter of law 
or fact, as to whether or not the named parties defend-
. ant do, or do not, constitute proper representation of 
all the owners of titles to, or interest in, lands likely to 
be affected by the relief sought in the eomplaint on file 
herein. It is further ordered that a copy of this minute 
be transmitted by the clerk of the ·court to respective 
counsel for the parties." 
3. If the affirmative defenses and counterclaims of 
these defendants are held not to be properly maintainable 
herein as class actions, then the trial court erred in denying 
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the 
ground that the plaintiffs failed to join indispensable par-
ties; failed to join all parties having a joint interest in the 
subject matter as required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; failed to join all parties owning or interested in 
land bordering Utah Lake who ·would be severely affected 
by a change in the level thereof; failed to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 19 (~c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
and the plaintiffs' action was not a proper class action with-
in the ·contemplation of Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
4. That if it be ·held that for purposes of these defend-
ants' affirmative defense to the complaint, and their coun-
terclaim, or as argued by the plaintiffs in suppo·rt of their 
petition for an intermediate appeal herein, that this action 
will affect users of water from Utah Lake other than the 
named defendants herein, then the trial court erred in de-
nying defendants said motion to dismiss on the ground that 
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. In such event 
this Court should declare that plaintiffs have failed to join 
indispensable parties in that they have failed to join such 
other users of the waters of Utah Lake of whose claims in 
the office of the State Engineer the Court will take judicial 
notice. These users would be affected by a determination 
herein of compromise point as sought in plaintiffs' com-
plaint, in that any storage they make would be under the 
plaintiffs herein and subject to the ·control of Utah Lake hy 
the plaintiffs. 
5. In plaintiffs' reply to defendants' counterclaim, they 
alleged as their purported tenth defense that "the claims 
asserted by the said defendants in said counterclaim and 
the issues made by said counterclaim are such as are not 
subject to determination and adjudication in the action." 
That the defendants moved to strike said purported defense 
and the trial court denied said motion. Error was thereby 
committed by the trial oo~. 
6. That each and all of the errors herein above speci-
fied are at least as fundamental to the rights of the parties 
and to the public interest, and probably more so, than the 
alleged errors claimed in plaintiffs' petition (for intermedi-
ate appeal); that their consideration by this Court upon in-
termediate appeal would be equally as vital as the consider-
ation of any other problems raised by their appeal and would 
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be equally, or more, helpful to the trial court when consid-
ering the merits as would be a determination of any points 
raised by the plaintiffs in their petition for an intermediate 
appeal. 
Based upon these factors, defendants' cross petition 
for intermediate appeal asked that if plaintiffs' petition were 
granted in whole or in part the Court include among the 
issues to be considered on such intermediate appeal (1) 
whether plaintiffs' action is properly maintainable as a class 
action; (2) whether plaintiffs have failed to name indis-
pensable parties, either plaintiff or defendant; (3) whether 
the defendants, as a class or by reason of their representa-
tion, by, or in the name of, .Utah Lake Farmers Association, 
may have their claims adjudicated under the counterclaim 
herein, and ( 4) whether the individual landowners who are 
not specifically named by plaintiffs as parties defendant 
must file individual, separate and independent actions for 
their damages or for the other relief to which they may be 
entitled. 
-The Supreme Court of Utah, in its order of November 
2, 1953, granted, at least in part, the petition for intermedi-
ate appeal in the following language: 
"The petition for an interlocutory appeal by plain-
tiffs herein having been considered, it is ordered that 
an interlocutory appeal be granted from the orders en-
tered on the 27th day of June, 1953, by the District 
1Court of Utah County, granting defendants' motion to 
strike certain portions from plaintiffs' replies and grant-
ing defendants' motion to strike certain portions from 
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit and petition 
for a preliminary injunction." 
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Literally the order seems to indicate that the plaintiffs 
petition for intermediate appeal, ex:cept as to the rulings on 
the motions to strike there involved, was denied, and this 
would in such event make impertinent plaintiffs' argument 
that the court erred in failing to dismiss defendants' coun-
terclaim. The foregoing order, limited by its terms to 
the petition for intermediate appeal by plaintiffs, does not 
purport to cover the cross petition for a consideration of 
other points by the defendants, and apparently a ruling on 
this cross petition has not been expressly made. However, 
we hope that since the matters are closely related, and be-
cause a consideration by this Court of all of the basic mat-
ters of law that may be involved at the trial will be most 
helpful to the parties and the trial court, this Court will 
consider both the matter of plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims and the matters mentioned above in connec-
tion with defendants' cross appeal. This, among other 
things, will permit appropriate amendments to the plead-
ings if such are indicated, and will permit the numerous 
land owners to bring their separate suits against the plain-
tiffs on the subject matter of the counterclaims herein, with-
in the period of the statute of limitations, should it be held 
that they ·cannot secure redress by reason of the represen-
tation of the defendants individually named by plaintiffi 
as representative of the class. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Defendants' counterclaims are valid claims for de-
claratory and injunctive relief, as well as valid claims on 
behalf of the defendants individually named, and are valid 
claims for damages to be established by numerous persons 
who the plaintiffs allege are members of a class in a sim-
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ilar situation. The trial court properly refused to dismiss 
said counterclaim, and the action of the trial court in so 
refusing to dismiss was correct. 
2. There was no error on the part of the trial court 
in striking from plaintiffs' replies the third and fourth pur-
ported defenses therein contained, for the reason that laches 
and estoppel, under applicable rules, must be specifically 
pleaded. There is nothing pleaded in said purported defen-
ses tending to show that the authorities cited are binding 
as an estoppel, or otherwise, upon these defendants or that 
the matter therein alleged as estoppel or laches relate to 
any point complained of by the defendants. 
3. The trial court did not err in striking the purported 
fifth defense since obviously the claim of adverse user was 
sham and frivolous, since the lake reached such high stage 
only once in every decade or so, and since the defendants 
were not complaining of any act authorized by the compro-
mise agreement. 
4. The trial court did not err in striking the plaintiffs' 
tenth defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo City, 
and the eleventh defense to the counterclaim of the other 
defendants, for the reason that under the rules of civil pre-
cedure the claim is certainly one pleadable as a permissive 
counterclaim and, in all probability, the counterclaim is man-
datory. The individual defendants clearly have the right 
to plead the counterclaim on their own behalf, and since they 
are also named as representatives of a class, and in order 
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in view of common issues, 
a counterclaim for and in behalf of the unnamed defendants 
should be interposed for their damages as well as for de-
clarative and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs having relied upon 
the class representation to afford the jurisdiction to pro-
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ceed are estopped from questioning the representation in 
connection with the counterclaims. The plaintiffs' position 
ignores the pleadings before the court which show that the 
acts complained · of are directly the acts of the plaintiffs, 
and there is nothing to show or to establish that the Utah 
Lake Commissioner or any other officer has any interest 
in compromise agreement or can assent any power in con-
nection therewith except for and at the behest of the plain-
tiffs.. If plaintiffs claim there are other parties in interest 
to this proceeding or any phase thereof, it should be their 
duty to make them parties to the proceeding. 
5. The trial court did not err in striking plaintiffs' 
twelfth defense to the counterclaim of the Utah County far-
mers for the reasons stated under point 4, and for the ad-
ditional reason that the authority relied upon by plaintiffs 
deals with problems arising prior to the new rules of civil 
procedure, and for the reason that, in any event, there is 
a unity of interest among the defendants as a ~class. With 
respect to the -complaint for damageS, there. are adequate 
means in this suit to permit individual claims to be filed 
and adjudication based upon common interests and common 
rights with a great saving of time and expense, and thereby 
to avoid a multipUcity of suits in the interest of all parties 
concerned, as well as in the interest of the courts of the 
State of Utah. 
6. The trial court did not err in striking the plaintiffs' 
eleventh defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo 
City, and plaintiffs' thirteenth defense to the counterclaim 
of the other Utah County landowners. The plaintiff initi-
ated the action going into the question of storage in Utah 
Lake, and if new parties, not named by the plaintiff, are 
indispensable the plaintiff should be required to bring them 
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in. As far as the counterclaims are concerned, we are seek-
ing an adjudication of rights between plaintiffs and defend-
ants as a class, and the defendants individually named, and 
if plaintiffs wish an adjudication involving other parties, it is 
their responsibility to see that those interests are brought 
into the proceeding. The State Engineer has no interest 
whatever in these issues, and since the plaintiffs did not 
wish to make the State Engineer a party they may not now 
complain thereof. 
7. The trial court did not err in striking plaintiffs' 
twelfth defense to the counterclaim of defendant, Provo 
City, and fourteenth defense to the counterclaim of the oth-
er defendants for the reason that the general adjudication 
proceeding referred to is not a bar to the suit involving such 
issue as construction of eontracts, trespass and the flowage 
rights. Smith vs. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 
Pac. 2d 539; Mitchell vs. Spanish Fork Westfield Irrigation 
Company, et al, 69 Utah 493, 265 Pac. 2d 1016. 
8. The trial court did not err in striking portions from 
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit for a preliminary 
injunction for the reason that such matters were not bind- ~ 
ing upon these defendants, or any of them, and were nort 
material to this proceeding for the reason stated in connec-
tion with other points herein treated and, in any event, such 
question is now probably moot. 
9. If the Supreme Court should determine that such 
counterclaims are not maintainable as a class action for and 
in behalf of the unnamed defendants, then, and in that event, 
the Court should eonsider defendants' cross petition for in-
termediate appeal, and the Court should determine that the 
district court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' com-
plaint for the reason that the complaint did not name in-
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dispensible parties and the plaintiffs, in such event, should 
be required to name all individuals and other interests con-
cerned in the question of the level of Utah Lake, so that they 
will have a standing in court to counterclaim for declara-
tory, injunctive and other relief, including damages, arising 
in connection therewith. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
In their brief, on page 19, plaintiffs set forth only para-
graph 15 of defendants' counterclaim, and then assert that 
the counterclaim should be dismissed on four grounds, name-
ly: (1) Because one of the dams complained of was in-
stalled in the river under an order of the District Court 
for Salt Lake County in 1914; (2) Because the plaintiffs 
claim the right to flow the lands of defendants up to com-
promise point at all times, irrespective of the source of the 
water; (3) Because a Water Commissioner appointed by 
the State Engineer has charge of the distribution of the 
water among the various claimants; and, (4) Because the 
Jordan River is a natural channel and authority to remove 
obstacles therefrom is vested in the Board of County Com-
missioners. In this brief defendants will treat these points 
in the order above named. 
At the outset it must be noted that plaintiffs have mere-
ly refe~rred to one of the allegations of the complaint and 
have picked a few isolated facts, without mention of many 
others, whi,ch they want the Court to find and interpret 
against defendants. They cite no statutes or decided cases 
whieh preclude the counterclaims. 
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Paragraph 15 of the counterclaims, referred to on page 
19 of plaintiffs' brief, is simply one of many allegations con-
tained in the ·counterclaims as a basis for defendants' claim. 
In essence, all of the allegations emphasize the fact that the 
plaintiffs have used the Jordan River just as freely as they 
would one of their own canals. The counterclaim alleges 
that the plaintiffs have placed dams and obstructions in the 
river contrary to compromise agreement; that they have 
changed the natural course of the river; that they have ele-
vated gauging devices on .Utah Lake and have otherwise 
wilfully and knowingly, caused the waters of the lake to 
be impounded therein to the damage of these defendants. 
Plaintiffs, in effect, ask the Court to disregard all of de-
fendants' allegations except paragraph 15 and to rule as 
a matter of law that that paragraph is vitiated and rendered 
innocuous because the particular dam therein referred to 
was allegedly installed under a court order. 
Plaintiffs do not allege nor do they contend that these 
defendants were parties to the proceedings they rely upon. 
None of the defendants were parties and no order issued 
as a result of such proceedings could be binding as against 
these defendants. TaDJ)jer vs. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 Utah 
158; 2 P. 2d 107. In that ease it was held that a decree was 
· not binding upon one who was not a party to the action, 
either directly or through his predecessor, even though he 
might be interested in the subject matter thereof. More-
over, the plaintiffs do not allege nor anywhere eootend that 
the dam in question cannot be used as an impounding device 
to hold back the waters in Utah Lake. The fact is that the 
dam in question is so designed that it can, by a simple ad-
justment to the gates, stop the flow of the river, and that 
carries with it the power to cut down or retard the flow of 
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the river. Even though the dam structure itself, when the 
gates are properly open, may be harmless to these defend-
ants, it would indeed be anomalous to hold that these de-
fendants are precluded by a court order in a proceeding to 
which they were not parties or bound, from raising the ques-
tion of improper operation of dam to the defendants' great 
damage. The ·compromise agreement preserves the right 
of the defendants to bring any suits against the plaintiffs 
or any of them for any future violations of the agreement 
or of the decree in the Colladge case. Salt Lake City v. Col-
ladge, 13 Utah 522, 45 Pac. 891. 
Plaintiffs assert that they have the right to flow defend-
ants' land up to compromise elevation at all times, irrespec-
tive of the source of water, and in support of their position 
quote one sentence from compromise agreement (Plaintiffs' 
Brief, page 24). The next sentence of the agreement shows 
the limited application of the sentence quoted by plaintiffs. 
It provides as follows: 
"Also the right in addition to the foregoing, free 
from liability or damage, to flow the lands of the par-
ties of the first part, or either of them, to the extent 
which may be caused by placing obstructions in the 
water way in said dam hereinbefore mentioned accord-
ing to tne limitation hereinafter specified for the pur-
pose of holding back or retarding the waters in Utah 
Lake at an elevation or height not to exceed 3 feet 3¥2 
inches above the points heretofore established as low 
water mark in said lake (compromise)***." (1) 
The sentence relied upon by plaintiffs gives them stor-
age rights only to the extent that the waters of the Jordan 
River are retarded by the bottom of the dam as then con-
( 1) Emphasis ours. 
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structed, plus 6 inches (Compromise Agreement). In other 
words, under that provision plaintiffs were protected only 
if the Jordan River was permitted its almost then free flow. 
The subsequent sentence above set forth in this brief makes 
the question of whether other obstructions can be placed 
in the river dependent upon whether or not the fall of snow 
during the past winter has been heavy or light. (See Com-
promise agreement). Obviously, the agreement relative to 
snow fall contemplated only the natural drainage area of 
Utah Lake. It was not and could. not have been in the eon-
templation of the parties that water from foreign water-
sheds would be brought into Utah Lake for storage, and 
that other waters or sources of water, then unknown, would 
be tapped and stored in Utah Lake by the plaintiffs and 
others in privity with the plaintiffs. The grant of an ease-
ment contemplates the then known factors and uses only. 
Defendants are not seeking damages arising more than three 
years before the filing of the counterclaim, but we are pri-
marily seeking to recover damages for 1952 and to prevent 
any recurrences of damages by unlawful flowage of defend-
ants' lands in future years. 
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the distribution 
of the waters of Utah Lake and the Jordan River have been 
under the supervision of a commissioner appointed by the 
court in 1914, and later by a commissioner appointed by 
the State Engineer. The function of the Water ·Commis-
sion appointed by the court in 1914 in a proceeding to which 
these defendants were not parties, was stated by the court 
in Salt Lake City, et al., vs. Salt Lake City Water and Elec-
tric Power Company, et al., 24 Utah 249; 67 P . .672, as fol-
lows: 
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"**To superintend and direct the measurement 
and division of all water, distributed by this decree in 
accordance therewith; to direct and supervise and in-
spect all means and appliance for the diversion, convey-
ance, and use of the same,****". 
The only responsibility of the Water Commission is to 
see that the claimants of the water receive, by accurate 
measurements, the waters awarded to them. The so-called 
"Morse Decree," as pointed out in plaintiffs' brief (pages 
10 and 12), involved only the right of the users of water in 
Salt Lake County, and dealt only with the problem of the 
maintenance of some proper fracility for measuring and dis-
tributing the waters as awarded under the decree. The 
compromise agreement and storage rights involving the in-
terest of these defendants was not an issue in the proceed-
ings. Moreover, these plaintiffs have neglected to point out 
to the C·ourt that the Water ·Commissioner is also retained 
by the plaintiffs as a consulting engineer. The Water c~om­
missioner has no right, by any authority whatever, in the 
exercise of his duties as such, to interfere with the flow of 
the river contrary to the provisions of the compromise 
agreement. Nor can these plaintiffs hide behind the Water 
Commissioner in the operation of a dam devised and built 
by them in the guise of a diversionary works but so installed 
and constituted that it ·can be used as an impounding dam, 
and the water taken by plaintiffs when they want it. 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Jordan River is a 
natural channel, and that the right to remove natural ob-
stacles therefrom is vested in the Board of County Commis-
sioners. Plaintiffs thus seek refuge in a statutory provision 
giving County Commissioners a power to do something if 
the Commission desires to exercise it. There is nothing 
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mandatory in the language quoted, nor can it be assumed 
therefrom that power to remove natural obstacles is limited 
to the county. It should also be noted that the power gran-
ted to counties is only exercisable in connection with "natu-
ral" obstacles. Defendants complain not only about slides 
that have been permitted to retard the flow of the river 
which might be ~called "natural" obstacles, but defendants 
also complain about obstacles and changes attributable di-
rectly to the efforts of the plaintiffs. The plain fact of the 
matter is, as the evidence will show, these plaintiffs have 
taken over the Jordan River as completely as they could 
if it were a private ·channel. They have, without consulting 
anyone, placed dams and obstructions as they saw fit; they 
have changed the natural course of the river as they desired; 
they have left the old Indian Ford Dam, except the super-
structure thereof, in the river; they have set up pumping 
apparatus as fit their whims, they have elevated gauge 
heights which were designed to show the level of the lake 
in relation to 'Compromise; they have removed obstructions 
that it suited their purpose to remove and have left others 
that it suited their purposes to leave. The plaintiffs dredged 
the river and then claimed and secured the right to increase 
the dam height. That increase carries with it the duty on 
the part of the plaintiffs to see that the river does at all 
times carry the water it purportedly carried at the time 
they secured the rights to raise the level of their dam. 
It is understandable that the plaintiffs would like to 
have the counterclaim dismissed on some alleged techni-
cality. However, as determined by the trial judge, these 
conjectures of the plaintiffs do not furnish basis for such 
dismissal, and the counterclaim sh·ould be heard by the 
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merits of the evidence. 
POINT 2 
Plaintiff ·claims that the trial tourt erred in striking 
their third and fourth defenses to the counterclaim. 
The third defense is premised upon the fact that the 
so-called "diversion works" in the Jordan Narrows were 
installed pursuant to a decree of the District Court for Salt 
Lake County entered February 13, 1914. As heretofore 
pointed out, none of these defendants were parties to the 
proceeding in que8tion, and could not be bound by any de-
cision therein rendered. Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Co., 
supra. The trial court so held, and the plaintiffs have not 
been able to cite any decided ·case or authority to bolster 
their claim. Plaintiffs' purported third defense does not 
state a defense by way of estoppel, or on any other basis. 
The defendants are not dependent upon the Utah Lake 
and Jordan Dam Commission to protect their rights. The 
Colladge case, supra, expressly points out that the decree 
"Shall not in any way prevent the defendants or any of them 
from bringing any suits against the plaintiffs or any of them 
for any future violation of the terms of the said contract 
(Compromise Agreement) or of this decree." The claims 
of defendants are based upon violations of the compromise 
agreement. 
The fourth defense, which the plaintiffs claim was er-
roneously stricken, appears to a claim of laches. Like es-
toppel, laches must be specifically pleaded. Plaintiffs plead-
ed mere conclusions. Plaintiffs cite no authority whatever 
for their contention. 
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POINT 3 
Under this point plaintiffs contend that the court erred 
in striking their fifth defense to the defendants' counterclaim. 
That defense ·claims a prescriptive right to flow the defend-
ants' lands and again cites the Morse Decree a proceed-
ing to which none of the defendants were parties, as author-
ity. The defense itself states that the lands have been 
flowed "at such times and under such conditions as speci-
fied and set forth under compromise agreement." In other 
words, they claim a prescriptive right to comply with com-
promise agreement. The plain fact is that the claimed de-
fense just doesn't state a defense at all. A permissive use 
cannot mature into a right through adverse possession, nor 
c~n an adverse right be acquired if the claimed adverse use · 
is of irregular or infrequent occurrence. 56 Am. Jur. 768 
and 772. Moreover, recovery for trespass is not barred be-
cause perchance there have been previous, long separated, 
trespasses. 
POINT 4 
Plaintiffs argue that the counterclaims are not subject 
to determination and adjudication in this proceeding. It is 
their position that only the compromise elevation question 
can be ·considered, because on that question the rights of 
the parties will turn. That proposition is not the fact at all. 
Plaintiffs and defendants are in dispute over a difference 
in compromise level of between 6 and 7 inches over the sur-
face of the lake. The defendants, however, have alleged in 
their ·counterclaims that the plaintiffs were responsible for 
the rise in the water of the lake to an elevation of several 
feet above compromise. Therefore, even if compromise 
point should be determined to be where plaintiffs claim it 
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is, there remains the question of the unlawful flooding by 
the plaintiffs in excess of that elevation. Hence the coun-
terclaim is not ·contingent for its total failure or success up-
on the outcome of the compromise level question. This case 
is then clearly distinguishable from the authority cited by 
plaintiffs. Even though the Court holds that the counter-
claims cannot be maintained as a class action upon the issue 
of damages, this would only make in order an amendment 
to enlarge the allegations as to class representation or an 
order that the additional numerous defendants be brought 
in personally, as the rules permit. 
There can be no escape from the fact that defendants 
Provo City and the other named defendants are in this law 
suit in their own individual capacity, even though they 
may also be labeled, in addition, as representatives of a class. 
So far as Pro¥o City is concerned, there can be no question 
but that the counterclaim is so stated as to entitle it to judg-
ment upon default of the plaintiffs. Even if plaintiffs pre-
vail in their principal action, the counterclaim here stated 
will not fall for that reason alone, as was the situation in 
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Coffelt, 11 
Fed. Rules Dec, 443, cited as authority by the plaintiffs. 
Other authorities ·cited by plaintiff are not in point. Taylor 
v. E. M. Royle Corp., a Utah case at 264 P. 2d 279, was a 
suit on a contract where recovery was allowed under quan-
tum meruit, and where the court held that the defendants 
had not had an opportunity to meet the issue. 
POINT 5 
Here plaintiffs attempt to avoid the impact of the coun-
terclaim by the Utah Lake Farmers Association and indi-
vidual defendants, except Provo City, by asserting that the 
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individual claims for damages cannot lJe determined or ad-
judicated in a class action. They rely upon Nunnely et al. 
v. First Federal Bldg. & Loan Assoc. of Ogd,en, et al., 107 
Utah 347, 154 P. 2d 620, 107 Utah 379, 159 P. 2d 141, a Utah 
case decided prior to the adoption of the New Utah Ruies 
of Civil Procedure. That case permitted the plaintiffs there-
in, in effect, to proceed with their class action, or in repre-
sentative form, up to a point where it became necessary to 
establish the validity of the individual claims. Then each 
individual claimant should be given an opportunity to come 
into the suit and claim the benefits thereof up to that point. 
Defendants in this case see no reason whatever why the 
same rationale should not apply in this instance, especially 
in view of the adoption of the New Rules. Even under the 
old practice it was decided in Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 
135 P. 2d 251, that a counterclaim for ordinary relief was 
proper in declaratory judgment action. 
POINT 6 
By their argument under this point plaintiffs asse·rt 
that there are other additional indispensable parties to the 
adjudication of the counterclaim who are not necessary par-
ties to the action instituted by plaintiffs. The arguments 
of plaintiffs are specious and with no particularity whatever, 
and are not supported by any authority whatever. Defend-
ants are not required to join all joint-tort feasors in any 
event. If plaintiffs claim indispensaJble parties, they can 
bring them in. These defendants were not parties to any 
proceeding giving the Water Commissioner power or author-
ity to regulate the flow of the Jordan River. Plaintiffs do not 
specify the additional parties whom they claim should be 
brought in. Their pleading is insufficient in that respect, 
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because it should specify particularly the names of those 
deemed by them to be indispensable, so that the Court could 
act upon the information so presented and make a specific 
order as to those particular parties. (See URCP 19). 
POiNT 7 
This point raises the question as to whether the in-
stant case involving alleged flooding of defendants' land by 
the plaintiffs in this action must be held in abeyance pend-
ing the outcome of a general adjudication proceeding. Salt 
Lake City v. Anderson, 106 Utah 350, 148 P. 2d 346. The 
issues are not even 'Contended to ·be identical or inter-depen-
dent. The Supreme Court of Utah, in Mitchell vs. Spanish 
Fork Westfield Irrigation Company, 265 P. 2d 1016, com-
pletely disposes of the question by holding that a general 
adjudication proceeding does not have the effect argued 
by the plaintiffs herein. Also, in Smith v. District Court 
supra, the question was decided adversely to plaintiffs' con-
tention. There the Supreme Court held that a general ad-
judication suit pending was not a bar because other ques-
tions were involved and other relief sought which were 
not involved in the general adjudication proceeding. 
POINT 8 
The trial court did not err in striking portions from 
plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit for preliminary 
injunction, for the reason that the matters therein stricken 
were not binding on these defendants, as has been previ-
ously herein pointed out. The matters stricken were re-
dundant and absolutely immaterial as far as these defend-
ants and the case is concerned. In any event, the point is 
now moot. 
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POINT 9 
Prior to the filing of the answers and counterclaims 
these defendants moved the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint for the reason that it failed to include indispen-
sable parties parties, both plaintiff and defendant, and that 
the named defendants were not representative of the class, 
and for ther reasons. The trial court denied that motion. 
Defendants raised the problem in this appeal by their cross 
appeal on file herein. 
Defendants take the position that if the Court should 
determine that the unnamed defendants are not entitled to 
have the damage question maintained as a ·class action, then 
the Court should also determine that the trial court erred in 
refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as requested by the 
named defendants. In such event the plaintiffs should be 
required to name all individuals concerned with the level 
of the water of Utah Lake so that they will have a standing 
in Court to ~counterclaim for declaratory, injunctive and 
other relief, including damages, arising from the flooding 
of their lands. 
As we have pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the 
order of the Court permitting the intermediate appeal seems 
to have been limited. We hope, however, that since all of 
these matters are so closely related, and because a decision 
would be helpful to the parties and to the trial court, this 
Court will consider defendants' cross appeal if it determines 
that the damage question ·cannot be maintained as a class 
action. A decision thereon will permit the numerous land-
owners to bring their separate suits against the plaintiffs on 
the subject matter of the counterclaim within the period of 
the statute of limitations should it be held that they cannot 
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secure redress through representation by the named defend-
ants up to the point where it becomes necessary to estab-
lish the amount of their individual damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The counterclaims filed by the defendants are proper 
claims for declaratory, injunctive and other relief, including 
the actual damages of the named defendants, and as a basis 
for proof of the actual damages of the unnamed defendants 
at a later stage in the proceeding. The defenses interposed 
by the plaintiffs, which were stricken by the trial court, 
were all redundant and immaterial and not binding on any 
defendant in this action. If the unnamed landowners do 
not have any standing before the trial court with respect 
to the question of their individual damages, the trial court 
erred in refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for their 
failure to bring in indispensable parties, and the plaintiffs 
should be required to bring each individual in as a party, 
so that there can be a full adjudication of all rights in this 
action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants, Utah 
Lake Farmers Association, et al., 
and 
CLAIR M. ALDRICH, 
of Aldrich & Bullock, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Provo City. 
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